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Religion in Eastern Europe - July 1998
The Catholic Church and Reconciliation with the Orthodox
in Eastern and Central Europe
by Ronald G. Roberson
Fr. Ronald G. Roberson, ordained 1977 (Paulist Fathers), with a
doctorate from the Pontifical Oriental Institute (Rome), is Associate
Director of the Secretariat for Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs
of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (Washington DC), having
served 1988-92 on the staff of the Orthodox section of the Pontifical
Council for Promoting Christian Unity in the Vatican.
In December 1991, Pope John Paul II convened a special Synod of
Bishops of Europe. Fraternal delegates from other churches and
ecclesial communities were invited to participate, and invitations had
been sent to the Orthodox Churches of Russia, Georgia, Serbia, Romania,
Bulgaria and Greece. But none accepted. To explain the matter, the
Patriarch of Constantinople sent Metropolitan Spyridon of Italy (now
the Archbishop of America) to address the Synod.
In his speech in the presence of the Pope, the Metropolitan said
that the Orthodox absence was due to the tensions that existed between
Catholics and Orthodox in Eastern and Central Europe. He listed two
main reasons for this: first, that the rebirth of so-called "uniate"
churches in that region had been accompanied by acts of violence, and,
secondly, that the setting up of parallel Catholic ecclesiastical
structures in those countries exceeded what was required to care for
the local Catholic populations. The Metropolitan continued:
The impression is now widespread among the Orthodox that [the
Catholic Church] is distancing itself from the Second Vatican Council,
and that the territories of countries which have been Orthodox for
centuries, now liberated from the communist regimes, are being
considered by their Roman Catholic brothers as terra missionis. (1)
The bishop warned that the situation was so bad that the theological dialogue might be suspended, or even completely broken off.
Similar concerns had been expressed by
the Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate the previous October when it
responded negatively to the papal invitation. (2) And
two months later, in February 1992, the Holy Synod of the Church of
Greece issued a strongly-worded statement charging Pope John Paul II
with being deceitful and dishonest in his relations with the Orthodox.
The Greek Bishops also accused the Holy See of using the Eastern
Catholic Churches to extend its influence in Orthodox countries and
called upon the Greek government to break off diplomatic relations with
the Vatican. (3)
So it was clear by late 1991 that the
collapse of communism in Eastern and Central Europe, happy as it was,
had also led to a breakdown in relations between Catholics and Orthodox
in the region. Struggles over church property that grew out of the
efforts of the Greek Catholics to regain what had been unjustly taken
from them was only one symptom of a deeper problem: among the Orthodox
in the area there was deep-seated suspicion about the true intentions
of the Catholic Church. Many were convinced that Rome, as well as other
western churches, was more than willing to take advantage of the
weakness of the Orthodox, who were just beginning to recover after
being hit so hard during the persecutions.
It is important to keep in mind that
these Orthodox fears were not entirely without foundation. When one
looks back over the long centuries that followed the schism between
East and West, there are a number of examples of Catholic actions that
contributed mightily to a growing Orthodox sense of being the victims
of Catholic aggression. The most notorious was the conquest and sacking
of Constantinople in 1204, which gave rise to the widespread Orthodox
attitude that they were better off under the Muslim turban than the
Latin miter. Of course, official unions between the two churches were
declared at the Second Council of Lyons in 1274 and the Council of
Ferrara-Florence in 1438-9, but each of them failed in the face of
popular opposition in the East. In the centuries that followed, the
relationship between the two old sister churches consisted of little
more than cold, hostile silence. Catholics and Orthodox ignored each
other and went their own ways, each of them responding separately to
the political and social developments that took place in their own
parts of the world.
In the West, there were a number of
factors that would influence Catholic attitudes towards the Orthodox,
including its political fragmentation and the emergence of the nation
states, and especially the shock of the Protestant Reformation. In
response, the Council of Trent was called to consider the need for new
ecclesial structures and reform. A strong centralizing tendency ensued,
which vigorously emphasized uniformity and obedience to the authority
of the papacy as essential for authentic ecclesial life. (4) It
now became possible to speak of reconciliation with the Orthodox only
as a "return" to Roman obedience. And there was now a theological
justification for sending Catholic missionaries to work among the
"dissidents" for the purpose of bringing them back to Catholic unity. A
corollary to this policy was the simultaneous development of the notion
of "rite." The emphasis on unity remained. But it now became possible
for groups of Orthodox Christians who came into union with Rome to be
absorbed into the single Catholic Church, while being allowed to
maintain their liturgical tradition as well as much of their canonical,
spiritual and theological patrimony. (5)
So there was a two-pronged Catholic
policy towards the Orthodox. On one hand, there was an effort to "bring
them back" to the church and absorb them into Catholic ecclesial
structures, a policy often called "unionism." On the other hand, in
many cases these new Catholics would be allowed to retain many of their
Orthodox rituals and traditions, a policy usually referred to today as
"uniatism." The basic attitude was clear: the Orthodox were wayward
Christians who needed in one way or another to be encouraged or even
induced to "return" to the Catholic fold. And the policy of uniatism,
since it sought to bring about a change in ecclesial allegiance with
only a minimal shift in piety and devotional practices, had the effect
of bringing significant numbers of former Orthodox faithful into the
Catholic Church. They formed "Eastern rite" communities that would be
Orthodox in liturgy and other traditions, but would fully accept
Catholic teaching and be under the jurisdiction of the bishop of Rome.
Especially in the Middle East, this policy served to divide and weaken
ancient Orthodox churches that had already suffered much under Islamic
domination. All this contributed to a deepening of that Orthodox sense
of being the victim of an aggressive West, which wanted nothing more
than to annex Orthodoxy to itself.
It was only in the 1960s that this
situation really began to shift. A positive evaluation of the Eastern
tradition is found in the documents of Vatican II, especially in Unitatis Redintegratio.
The Council clearly stated that the Orthodox are "churches" in the full
sense of the word, and that they have valid sacraments. This would lay
the foundation for the setting aside of the "unionist" ecclesiology,
and the development of an ecclesiology of communion and the related
notion that Catholics and Orthodox are "sister churches."
This coincided with the development of
what became known as the "dialogue of charity," a kind of learning to
trust one another again, a process that had to take place before any
fruitful theological dialogue could begin. In January 1964 Pope Paul VI
and Patriarch Athenagoras of Constantinople met for the first time, in
Jerusalem. On December 7, 1965 in Rome and Istanbul they simultaneously
proclaimed the lifting of the mutual excommunications of 1054,
declaring them "erased from the memory" of the church. (6)
All this was the prelude to the
establishment of the theological commission by Pope John Paul II and
Patriarch Dimitrios I of Constantinople in 1979. Its first ten years of
work reflected the growing consensus between the two communions, and
saw the publication of three agreed statements on such issues as the
relationship between the Trinity, the Church and Eucharist; the
sacraments of initiation and the connection between common faith and
sacramental communion; and the theology of the ordained ministry. (7)
Unfortunately, however, all these
hopeful developments took place at a time when the majority of the
world's Orthodox faithful were suffering under communist rule. They
were largely cut off from the outside world, and remained mostly
unaffected by these changes. The same was true of Catholics in the
region, who for the most part had not been able to assimilate the
reforms introduced into the church by the Second Vatican Council. And
so, when communism finally fell in 1989 and religious freedom was
restored, both Catholics and Orthodox displayed attitudes towards one
another that made many of us in the West who encountered them feel as
though we were in some kind of time warp. This is what I like to call
the "Rip Van Winkle effect," where it was as if these Christians had
awakened after a decades-long sleep and found the world around them
profoundly changed.
And so, in Eastern and Central Europe
in the period immediately after 1989, the old attitudes that most of us
thought were long dead and buried emerged with new vigor. The ancient
Orthodox fears of the true intentions of the West--whether Catholic or
Protestant--came to the fore, and showed up in denunciations of actions
that from a Western perspective seemed quite normal and inoffensive.
The reemergence of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine was seen as a
revival of the Catholic policy of uniatism, as a kind of Trojan Horse
meant to deceive the Orthodox and draw the credulous away from the
church of their ancestors. The appointment of Catholic bishops in the
former Soviet Union was seen as an effort not to respond to the needs
of the Catholics who lived there, but to set up a missionary structure
to convert the Orthodox to Catholicism.
Similar fears and mistrust typical of a
past age emerged among the Catholics of the region, who were convinced
that the Orthodox, who were essentially corrupt and all too susceptible
to state manipulation, were intent on regaining their status as state
churches, and imposing severe restrictions on their Catholic neighbors.
Functioning out of the only ecclesiology they knew, they were equally
convinced that they had the duty to do what they could to bring about
the "return" of as many Orthodox as possible to the one true Church of
Christ. And when they began to hear about the ecumenical developments
that took place during the persecutions, they often criticized them as
the result of a naive understanding of true Orthodox intentions. Things
were made worse by the fact that in the early years after 1989 there
were a number of Catholic free-lance missionary groups who sent workers
into Russia to "bring the Gospel" to an area which, in their minds,
languished in the darkness of paganism.
Such was the situation when
Metropolitan Spyridon rose to speak before the Special Synod for Europe
in Rome in December 1991 to explain why the Orthodox had stayed home.
There is no doubt that he was articulating the real fears of many of
his fellow Orthodox in the region.
The Vatican had been monitoring this
situation closely, and was dismayed when relations between Catholics
and Orthodox quickly deteriorated after the end of communism. It is
clear that Pope John Paul II wanted to do whatever he could to foster
reconciliation between the two groups. After all, he had devoted much
energy during his pontificate to the improvement of Catholic-Orthodox
relations, and it was clear that much of what had been achieved was in
jeopardy. There was an urgent need to reaffirm the Catholic Church's
commitment to the dialogue, and its respect for the Orthodox Church.
This concern gave rise to a number of papal statements and documents. But there are two that stand out as the most important.
The first was a "Letter of Pope John Paul II to the Bishops of Europe on Relations between Catholics and
Orthodox in the New Situation of Central and Eastern Europe," dated May
31, 1991, (8) a full six months before Spyridon spoke. The Pope begins by summarizing
the changes that had taken place, and the new tensions with the
Orthodox, especially over the return of Catholic property that had been
confiscated by the communists. This had taken place partially, the Pope
writes, "as a result of the wounds left by the painful experiences of
the past."
Pope John Paul then writes about the Eastern Catholic Churches and the process of their reorganization. He
said that this should take place according to the principles of Vatican
II, with utmost respect for their Eastern patrimony. Vatican II
principles should inspire the organization of those churches, the
theological formation of their clergy, and the catechetical instruction
of their faithful.
The Pope then observes that Vatican II taught that the promotion of Christian unity was an integral part of
the life of the Catholic Church, and that this applies to Eastern
Catholics as well. In recent decades the search for unity between
Catholics and Orthodox has taken on a "new method," he wrote. He
recalled Vatican II's recognition of the validity of Orthodox
sacraments, and that therefore "relations with these Churches are to be
fostered as between sister Churches."
All this has pastoral consequences, the Pope writes. The first is that Catholics must respect the Orthodox
hierarchy and church organization, which means doing nothing to cause
division or confusion in Orthodox communities. A second consequence is
"the rejection of all undue forms of proselytism, with the avoidance in
the most absolute way in pastoral action of any temptation to violence
and any form of pressure." At the same time, one must respect the
freedom of individuals to join the Catholic Church if they so desire.
It's all a matter of respecting the action of the Holy Spirit in
people's lives. And thirdly, the Pope writes that it is not enough to
simply avoid mistakes: "it is also necessary to promote positively
coexistence with mutual and harmonious respect." This should include
common pastoral action whenever possible.
In his conclusion, the Pope writes that:
It is my heartfelt desire that whenever Oriental Catholics and Orthodox live side by side, there will be
established relations which are fraternal, mutually respectful and
sincerely seeking a common testimony to the one Lord... Being faithful
witnesses to Jesus Christ who has set us free should be the main
concern n our time of cultural, social and political changes, so that
we can preach together and with credibility the one Gospel of
salvation, and be builders of peace and reconciliation in a world
always threatened by conflicts and wars.
As positive as this was, Metropolitan
Spyridon's words and other events quickly made it clear that more
needed to be said. So a decision was made to issue an authoritative
document from the Holy See that would guide Catholic activities in the
region, especially in relation to the local Orthodox Churches. The
office of the Roman Curia that would issue the document was the
long-inactive Pro Russia Commission. It had been
instituted by Pius XI in 1930 to oversee Catholic efforts among the
Russians both in Russia and abroad. It was replaced in January 1993 by
the Permanent Interdicasterial Commission for the Church in Eastern
Europe.
This document was issued on June 1,
1992. Its title is, "General Principles and Practical Norms for
Coordinating the Evangelizing Activity and Ecumenical Commitment of the
Catholic Church in Russia and in the Other Countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)." (9) When
the document was sent out to the Catholic bishops, cover letters stated
that, while the text was written primarily with the former Soviet Union
in mind, the principles found in it apply mutatis mutandis to other places where Catholics and Orthodox live side by side.
The first section of the Pro Russia
document contains general principles. The document affirms that the
Catholic Church has a right to provide for the pastoral care of its own
faithful. But this should not be seen as a way of entering into
competition with the Russian Orthodox Church. The ecumenical dimension
of Catholic mission activity in those countries must be a pastoral
priority. Indeed, because of their common heritage, "Catholics and
Orthodox can bear common witness to Christ before a world which yearns
for its own unity."
The document goes on to state that
Catholic activities in traditionally Orthodox countries should be
conducted in ways that take this heritage fully into account. The
Byzantine and Armenian traditions are to be held in special esteem, and
Catholics should promote cooperation with the Orthodox wherever
possible.
The second section gives practical
directives. The Catholic authorities are asked to provide for an
ecumenical formation for their clergy and to promote a climate of trust
and peaceful cooperation. They should also ensure that no Catholic
activity appear to establish "parallel structures of evangelization"
over against the Orthodox. All Catholics involved in the apostolate in
those countries are asked to work under the close supervision of the
Catholic bishops. This provision was widely seen as an attempt to
control the "Fatima fanatics" who had begun missions in Russia.
The Pro Russia
Commission also instructs Catholic authorities to inform local Orthodox
bishops of all their important pastoral initiatives, especially the
opening of new parishes. And in a key passage the document even states
that Catholic pastors should "endeavor to cooperate with the Orthodox
bishops in developing pastoral initiatives of the Orthodox Church. They
should be pleased if by their contribution they can help to train good
Christians" (n. 4).
In my view, this is the most helpful
and positive document that the Vatican has ever promulgated on the
subject of Catholic-Orthodox relations. It does much to clarify true
Catholic intentions in the region. It is authoritative, it is soundly
based on an ecclesiology of communion, and respects the ecclesial
nature of the Orthodox Churches, as well as the priority they enjoy in
their historic homelands.
It should also be noted that the
document is unilateral: there is no equivalent text from the Orthodox
side that sets a similar tone for relations with the Catholic Church.
But it is clear that the authorities of the Catholic Church felt it was
necessary to take extraordinary actions in view of the extraordinary
events that unfolded in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989 and
following. The Catholic Church has taken the unprecedented step of
acknowledging the priority of the Orthodox Church in large parts of
Eastern Europe, has forbidden its faithful to proselytize among the
Orthodox, and has even encouraged them to assist directly the Orthodox
Church as it resumes a normal life after the end of the persecutions.
True, there is resistance to the implementation of this policy on the
ground. But the principles on which it is based are sound, and fully
consistent with the teachings of the Second Vatican Council. It is an
outstretched hand of friendship, and a call for reconciliation.
[ Religion in Eastern Europe | www.georgefox.edu/academics/undergrad/departments/ soc-swk/ree/reeful183.html ]
[ Religion in Eastern Europe | www.georgefox.edu/academics/undergrad/departments/ soc-swk/ree/Roberson_The%20Catholic.html ]
[ Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe | digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/ vol18/iss3/1/ ]
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